ARNOLD KLING
August 14, 2011
The Top Political Contributors
August 11, 2011
Gender and the New Commanding Heights
August 11, 2011
Jamie Galbraith Makes an Assumption
August 11, 2011
Macroeconometrics: The Science of Hubris
August 10, 2011
Real and Nominal Bond Yields
BRYAN CAPLAN
August 14, 2011
The Effect of Thumb Sucking on Income
August 12, 2011
The Voice of Cold, Hard Truth to All Would-Be Educators
August 12, 2011
Ability, Morality, and Prosperity: A Paper and a Report
August 11, 2011
The Theory of Time and Frittering
August 10, 2011
Male Variance and the Remnants of the Gender Gap
DAVID HENDERSON
August 9, 2011
Hayek in "Unbroken", Part Two
August 8, 2011
Hayek in "Unbroken"
August 5, 2011
James Bovard on the Peace Corps
August 4, 2011
Summers Way Off on FDR and 1941
August 3, 2011
The "Amazon" Tax


It sounds like what Jensen is saying is this:
1. Managers may have private information that leads them to conclude that the stock is overvalued, since the market value is determined by public information.
2. They expect there private information to become public eventually, driving down the stock price.
3. If they hold stock or options they then have a huge incentive to keep the bad news private, or even to distort information.
This really doesn't seem to me to have a lot to do with EMH since the problem arises from private information.
By the way, I'm not sure it's correct to say that EMH holds that the price is the "best measure.. of the future value of a company." That's a tricky statement.
“Managers may have private information that leads them to conclude that the stock is overvalued, since the market value is determined by public information. “
This is why as a layman, I have a difficult time understanding the overall concept of insider trading. I concede that there are instances where it’s obvious the law has been broken. Nonetheless, often the color gray best explains the issues involved. Am I being overly cynical to suspect that the more brilliant manger runs the risk of being arrested?
According to some academic theory of corporate governance, managers can be evaluated by one single all-encompassing measure of performance. This is ridiculous on its face.
As far as tying the compensation of managers to a strict quantitative formula in advance of their performance period, this practice invites "gaming the system" and tends to absolve the compensation committee of the Board of Directors from responsibly reviewing company results and then ex post facto deciding on a fair reward based on quantitative and qualitative indicators of varying number and identity that they may choose as most relevant in each period.
What is needed to mitigate against corporate scandals are more-independent directors and less incentive stock OPTIONS in contrast to incentive stock, with no financing by the corporation of the managers' leveraged stock purchases.