November 27, 2008
Singapore Gives Thanks
November 27, 2008
Thanksgiving Thoughts
November 27, 2008
Emperor, Clothes, etc.
November 27, 2008
Letter of Law, Spirit of Law
November 26, 2008
Different Forms of Government
November 26, 2008
Roderick Long and the Tiny Gnomes from Neptune
November 26, 2008
When You're in a Hole, Keep Digging
November 26, 2008
Singapore's Policy Secret: Economic Literacy, Deference, or Resignation?
November 26, 2008
Notes on McArdle's Law


Simple idiocy. It does not aid in containment of medical costs at all, actually increases Government liability, endangers the security net by leaving it to aged Seniors to comply with the requirements, and gives equal status to all Seniors--quadrupling the bill. There need be limitation of liability in Government funding, not vast riches for the health care industry. lgl
Drawbacks:
1. It transfers risk from insurance companies to the taxpayers. Require any insurance company that wants to accept the vouchers to charge nearly uniform rates.
2. There should be a pool of some type for those who neglect to utilize their voucher. Something along the lines of a default coverage that is changed as soon as the individual chooses how to spend their voucher.
3. The voucher's size should be limited to the tax base, refundable against employer provided insurance, donatable to charity or other people's health needs, and probably able to be turned into cash somehow in order to provide an incentive for people to find economical coverage.
This assumes that a person's health can be qualified in a practical way, which isn't true. For instance, the disability related to Alzhiemer's or ALS ranges from near zero to complete incapacitation - with varying degrees of need (cost) associated with each side of the range. Other Dx can be somewhat subjective, such as depression.
The worst part about this would be the policization of costs associated with each disease type. For instance, if you only give an extra $500 for general hypertension, but $5,000 for more advanced heart disease there will be a lot of arguements about prevention. More critically, if you budget only a $500 bonus for diabetes, but $750 for asthma you will be accused of not caring about diabetes as much as asthma. The next year, diabetics will get $750 too. But now you are anti-gay because you increased the allotment for diabetics by 50%, while keeping the $8,000 bonus for HIV the same.
Now imagine the fraud from false Dx...
There is also a reverse incentive for cost-cutting in treatment of any particular Dx.
Pooling everyone together may be viewed as economically ineffecient, but it bypasses a lot of other ineffeciencies and is the best solution.
Can't this be said for catastrophic reinsurance plan?
Are these really drawbacks or fine points. Can't we make a similar claim about the catastrophic reinsurance plan and number 3?
I'm curious as to why there wouldn't be a cost containment problem with the catastrophic reinsurance program? What is to stop the politicians from periodically lowering the limit on coverage in exchange for votes?
The government needs to decide when to allow people to die. No matter how we try to pay for it, we just can't pay huge amounts extending the lives of elderly people by a few weeks.