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The author at Truck and Barter in a related article titled Utility Functions and Limited Rationality writes:
COMMENTS (11 to date)
Scott Scheule writes:
I have no idea which one of you's right, but keep fighting. This is fascinating. Posted April 16, 2005 9:31 PM
Brandon Berg writes:
That people try to maximize happiness seems tautological to me. "Happiness" is the degree to which one is satisfied with the current state of one's affairs, and all rational action is aimed--albeit not always accurately--at bringing about a preferable state of affairs in the future. The evolutionary purpose of other emotions, then, may be to cause dissatisfaction which would otherwise not have been felt, thereby prompting actions which improve chances of survival. Curiosity causes mild dissatisfaction with one's own ignorance, prompting experimentation which may lead to useful discoveries. Fear causes intense dissatisfaction with being in a dangerous situation, prompting flight. So happiness is the meter that tells you how well you're doing, and the other emotions are just there to calibrate it. Posted April 16, 2005 11:02 PM
Bernard Yomtov writes:
I don't really get this happiness research business. We ask Jack, who makes $20K, and Jill, who makes $50K, how happy they are, and find only a small difference. So we conclude that Jill's extra $30K doesn't generate a lot of extra happiness. But we are dealing with two different people. The comparison is meaningless. In fact, isn't it likely that individuals who follow financially less rewarding professions are precisely those to whom material rewards are less important, while the opposite applies to those who seek high-paying jobs? In other words, money means more to Jill than to jack, and the outcome of the survey is wholly predictable. Maybe I'm missing something. Posted April 17, 2005 10:51 AM
John Thacker writes:
Hmm. Seems the problem is mostly in the definitions of happiness. Of course, since many behaviorists would basically define happiness as "the thing that people try to maximize through their behavior" (i.e., what people want), it's a bit circular. It is, certainly, fairly easy to argue that while people "trad[e] off their own happiness for the happiness of others," that this serves some sort of greater or truer happiness on their part. They would be more unhappier if they didn't do this. In short, I don't think that the two of you really mean the same thing when you say happiness. Posted April 17, 2005 11:12 AM
asg writes:
One thing that jumps out at me is what may be a tension between Bryan's earlier expressed ideas about irrationality and his rejection of behaviorism here. Specifically, in his writing about rational irrationality, he quotes an author who says that Muslim soldiers who have been promised paradise if they die in battle nonetheless often opt for retreat. In other words, their behavior contradicts their stated preferences. Bryan's argument depends in part on this, since he wants to argue that certain types of irrationality have a marginal cost of zero to the "consumer" of that irrationality. But the only way to reach that conclusion is to say that the behavior of the religious fanatic is what matters, rather than what he says he believes (since if you believe what he says, and disregard the behavior, the marginal cost of his loony beliefs is very high indeed). So which is it? When trying to figure out the marginal cost of a particular irrational belief, do we look at the consumer's behavior, or what he says? Posted April 17, 2005 3:06 PM
Jason Ligon writes:
asg is spot on. At the end of the day, you have to be able to address discrepancies between stated preference and action. The behaviorist approach is to try to describe costs to the person irrespective of what they say. The non behaviorist approach is what? Are you trying to analyize economic behavior or are you trying to penetrate why people say X and do Y? I think it is clear that the analysis of ultimate behavior must discount reported preferences when the two disagree, which is just another way of saying that reported preferences are at best second rate tools of analysis that are only as strong as their correlation to behavior. Why not just study behavior? Posted April 18, 2005 1:35 PM
Paul N writes:
The idea that people maximize happiness is bizarre to me. People are evolutionarily geared to reproduce, not to be happy. People (men especially) seek power and status to impress mates, at a cost to their happiness, whether they do so consciously or not. Posted April 18, 2005 1:39 PM
Jason Ligon writes:
"Does their behavior really contradict their answers? Only if people maximize their own happiness - as philosophers would say, if psychological hedonism is true." I don't think that hedonism is implied by Arnold's comments. All he is saying is that you want to study happiness, and happiness doesn't tell you very much about actual choices. Ergo, there is not much point in studying happiness. Posted April 18, 2005 1:43 PM
Lawrance George Lux writes:
I agree with both of you, and think there is not that much difference. How does one define Happiness, with the existence of masochism? lgl Posted April 18, 2005 1:44 PM
Lancelot Finn writes:
Caplan offers a whirlwind of objections to behaviorism, of varying persuasiveness. His last point-- why are there so many emotions if only happiness matters?-- is either missing or beside the point, because when economists say happiness they mean utility, and utility is a construct designed to capture all the things that people want. Does Bryan want to feel more curious? If so, curiosity is part of his utility function. But I sympathize with the thrust of his post. I argued in the comments of the last post on this topic that the problem with constructing utility based on revealed preference is that we mostly have occasion to reveal our preferences with respect to goods that can be purchased with money and/or enjoyed individually; but much of the happiness we get from life meets neither criterion. The sociality of enjoyment, and the limitations of money as proxy for utility, are theoretical weaknesses of Kling's behaviorism which could help to motivate a new emphasis on the concerns raised by Caplan. Posted April 18, 2005 3:22 PM
Kurt Brouwer writes:
OK. I believe you each have your point of view on this issue. Can we call it a draw so you can move on to other issues? How about the Current Account Deficit or if you like behavioral issues, how about Behavioral Finance? Or, almost anything, just not economic behaviorism. KB Posted April 18, 2005 4:47 PM
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