BRYAN CAPLAN
May 7, 2013
Keynesian Bets: What's Out There
May 6, 2013
Keynesian Bets Bleg
May 6, 2013
The Pyramid of Macroeconomic Insight and Virtue
May 2, 2013
A Natalist Provision
May 1, 2013
I Was a Teenage Misanthrope
DAVID HENDERSON
May 5, 2013
John Thacker on Vaccinations and the Sequester
May 3, 2013
Chef Rudy's Virtues Project
May 2, 2013
My take on Reinhart and Rogoff
May 1, 2013
Medicare Kills a Program


"The planning illusion". Exactly!
It occurs to me that it isn't so much a matter of planning vs improvisation, but rather a failure of problem definition. Military planning, like any good planning, includes planning for improvisation. The primary reason a plan fails is because it attempts to solve the wrong problem. The problem to be solved in a hurricane is to first evacuate and then provide shelter, food, and water for large numbers of people. It is a massive logistical operation, but not particularly complicated. But if the problem is seen as "how do we coordinate the actions of numerous government agencies", then the real problem becomes of only secondary importance - and solving it becomes exponentially less likely.
One of the interesting developments of the last couple of decades has been the impact of the computer revolution on business pratices.
One major development is "just in time inventories" that computers allowed.
In the old days firms maintained much higher inventory level just in case of shocks to the system. So shocks could be absorbed much more by changes in inventories rather then price.
It was a cost to business but a benefit to the economy as a whole.
But the computer revolution has allowed the economy to act more and more like the economists perfectly competitive model, and we are seeing one aspect of this now with essentially the entire adjustment costs now being reflected in price changes rather then inventory changes.
Are we better off because of it? Probably.
At least for the time being we do not know the complete answer to this. We have data on oil shipments, and assume that is final demand.
So we do not yet know how much of the adjustment
was in the form of changes in retail inventories
and how much was in the form of a change in true final demand.
'This analysis boggles the mind, because it suggests that Hitler's Wermacht was a model of decentralization and improvisation.'
I don't think the ability to defeat France would necessarily be that. However, the Germans did have Rommel in charge of that offensive, and he later came to be known as the Desert Fox.