October 11, 2009
Britain's Central Planning Death Panels
October 11, 2009
Free Market M.D.
October 11, 2009
Economies of Scale in Compliance
October 11, 2009
Balan's Challenge
October 10, 2009
The Pleasure of Telling Others What to Do
October 10, 2009
Gonick the Great - and How He Could Have Been Greater
October 9, 2009
More Scott Sumner
October 9, 2009
Not From The Onion
October 9, 2009
Thoughts on a Second Stimulus
Interesting. A couple of thoughts;
1. Information has value as an additive, not as a replacement. Good intel is very important and always has been (e.g., a primary value of airpower is the ability to observe the enemies movements). But someone still has to kick in the door and shoot people, or all that intel does nothing but keep spooks employed.
2. It wasn't Al Queda's invisibility that made them dangerous, but rather their ability to operate openly. It was only with Afghanistan as a "base" for operations that they were able to coordinate large operations. Driven underground, they have found it very difficult to do anything but post threats on radical websites. In my opinion the "whack a mole" strategy is exactly right. Keep an eye out for any concentration of force, and destroy it. The trick is to be in position to whack. The insurgent's tactics are the tactics of desperation - a last resort used only when unable to concentrate forces.