October 11, 2009
Britain's Central Planning Death Panels
October 11, 2009
Free Market M.D.
October 11, 2009
Economies of Scale in Compliance
October 11, 2009
Balan's Challenge
October 10, 2009
The Pleasure of Telling Others What to Do
October 10, 2009
Gonick the Great - and How He Could Have Been Greater
October 9, 2009
More Scott Sumner
October 9, 2009
Not From The Onion
October 9, 2009
Thoughts on a Second Stimulus
You know, if determinism is true, Tyler wouldn't act any differently, anyway. That's kinda the point of determinism.
The rational response to a performative contradiction is not to embrace it but to eliminate it: either change your belief or change your practice. Tyler's refusal to do this represents an uncharacterstic lapse by an otherwise eminently rational man. He is saying, in effect: Sometimes I believe A. But because I also sometimes believe not-A, it is unfair to use my belief in A as evidence for A.
Not one of his stronger positions.
It seems like a linguistic trick. Its true that what he believes doesn't prove the truth, but how he acts does show what he believes.
The fact that he wouldn't act differently depending upon his beliefs for a few cases (such as, perhaps, determinism) is not relevant to the particular case in question.
In the particular case, he would act differently if he believed differently.
Curious that an economist of Tyler's stature would maintain that revealed preference is no big thing.
It seems perfectly reasonable to me to say that people often don't live up to their aspirations and beliefs.
I believe that I would be healthier if I lost weight, and yet I do not do that. Do I actually believe that I don't need to lose weight? No, I'm just not succeeding at it.
We are not computers, we are organic beings. When you guys depart from financial transactions into human behavior (like dating) and philosophy (a subject as rediculously unquantifiable as 'alikeness') you are simply not saying anything useful.