January 5, 2010
The Economics of the Microsoft Case
January 5, 2010
The Economics of Illegal Drugs
January 5, 2010
Intellectuals and Society
January 5, 2010
Thinking Outside the House
January 5, 2010
FP2P Watch
January 5, 2010
The Books I Wish My Colleagues Would Write
January 4, 2010
Predictably Irrational or Predictably Rational?
January 4, 2010
My Sowell-mate on the Knowledge-Power Discrepancy
January 4, 2010
FP2P Watch
You know, if determinism is true, Tyler wouldn't act any differently, anyway. That's kinda the point of determinism.
The rational response to a performative contradiction is not to embrace it but to eliminate it: either change your belief or change your practice. Tyler's refusal to do this represents an uncharacterstic lapse by an otherwise eminently rational man. He is saying, in effect: Sometimes I believe A. But because I also sometimes believe not-A, it is unfair to use my belief in A as evidence for A.
Not one of his stronger positions.
It seems like a linguistic trick. Its true that what he believes doesn't prove the truth, but how he acts does show what he believes.
The fact that he wouldn't act differently depending upon his beliefs for a few cases (such as, perhaps, determinism) is not relevant to the particular case in question.
In the particular case, he would act differently if he believed differently.
Curious that an economist of Tyler's stature would maintain that revealed preference is no big thing.
It seems perfectly reasonable to me to say that people often don't live up to their aspirations and beliefs.
I believe that I would be healthier if I lost weight, and yet I do not do that. Do I actually believe that I don't need to lose weight? No, I'm just not succeeding at it.
We are not computers, we are organic beings. When you guys depart from financial transactions into human behavior (like dating) and philosophy (a subject as rediculously unquantifiable as 'alikeness') you are simply not saying anything useful.