ARNOLD KLING
August 14, 2011
The Top Political Contributors
August 11, 2011
Gender and the New Commanding Heights
August 11, 2011
Jamie Galbraith Makes an Assumption
August 11, 2011
Macroeconometrics: The Science of Hubris
August 10, 2011
Real and Nominal Bond Yields
BRYAN CAPLAN
August 14, 2011
The Effect of Thumb Sucking on Income
August 12, 2011
The Voice of Cold, Hard Truth to All Would-Be Educators
August 12, 2011
Ability, Morality, and Prosperity: A Paper and a Report
August 11, 2011
The Theory of Time and Frittering
August 10, 2011
Male Variance and the Remnants of the Gender Gap
DAVID HENDERSON
August 9, 2011
Hayek in "Unbroken", Part Two
August 8, 2011
Hayek in "Unbroken"
August 5, 2011
James Bovard on the Peace Corps
August 4, 2011
Summers Way Off on FDR and 1941
August 3, 2011
The "Amazon" Tax
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This is close to McNeill's analysis in The Pursuit of Power (although he stresses structural factors not ideas).
Markets helped China flourish economically and technologically from 1000-1400 but were eventually suppressed by a rent-extractive state (command) that had effective veto power over market operation.
States in Europe were unable to command markets because the markets themselves were divided amongst numerous conflicting kingdoms (kings in one state had to bargain with market actors in another to get access to foreign resources).
Even if they wanted to command markets, however, it wasn't in their interest since markets provided new military technology necessary to survive intense inter-state security competition.
China's incentive, on the other hand, was domestic stability (intra-state security) because it didn't need to harness markets to compete militarily with neighbors. The state decided to control the development of technology that might threaten its control.
Competition. Europe was a competitive cauldron while China had become a bureaucratic monolith. Also, China fell to western imperialism for lack of only a few key military technologies - a situation that has been largely corrected in the last short century.
You could even possibly cite north Korea as a nation lacking a free flow of ideas and institutions, hence the poor standard of living.
"This is close to McNeill's analysis in The Pursuit of Power"
A very interesting book, and an interesting post. I think more work ought to be done on the economic and developmental history of China, since it is glaringly odd that at one point it had more iron production than early industrial England.
An analysis on China's economic and developmental history would be very interesting, but I'd be more interested in a book examining the future of China and taking a hard look at its presumed role as a world superpower in the near future.
We seem to be collectively caught in the glamor of China, but it is a hideously corrupt state that does not use resources efficiently or in any way reflecting their true cost. It is one reason many of the regions in China are dancing on the precipice of environmental apocalypse.
I suspect China is much closer to upheaval and regression than it is to evolving into a superpower. I hope I'm wrong, but I'd sure like to see a lot more work examining the hypothesis.
Hi Arnold,
"Nick Schulz and I have a forthcoming book called From Poverty to Prosperity, in which we emphasize intangible factors that affect the standard of living. Ideas and institutions play a central role,..."
Unless your thinking has changed since 2004, the factors that you think will affect economic growth in the future are computer technology, computer technology, and computer technology:
http://markbahner.typepad.com/random_thoughts/2004/10/3rd_thoughts_on.html
So I guess your book must be about economic history and the very near economic future (i.e. less than 20 years into the future)?
Best wishes,
Mark