ARNOLD KLING
August 14, 2011
The Top Political Contributors
August 11, 2011
Gender and the New Commanding Heights
August 11, 2011
Jamie Galbraith Makes an Assumption
August 11, 2011
Macroeconometrics: The Science of Hubris
August 10, 2011
Real and Nominal Bond Yields
BRYAN CAPLAN
August 14, 2011
The Effect of Thumb Sucking on Income
August 12, 2011
The Voice of Cold, Hard Truth to All Would-Be Educators
August 12, 2011
Ability, Morality, and Prosperity: A Paper and a Report
August 11, 2011
The Theory of Time and Frittering
August 10, 2011
Male Variance and the Remnants of the Gender Gap
DAVID HENDERSON
August 9, 2011
Hayek in "Unbroken", Part Two
August 8, 2011
Hayek in "Unbroken"
August 5, 2011
James Bovard on the Peace Corps
August 4, 2011
Summers Way Off on FDR and 1941
August 3, 2011
The "Amazon" Tax


Ok, so the regulatory authorities did not say "don't stick your head in the bucket" and therefore its a failure of regulation?
Firms evaluate their business risk, even when they are subject to legal risk. If mandatory capital requirements were insufficient you might conclude that business risks exceeded legal risks, but so what? What is the purpose of banks if regulators must evaluate business risks. Market-to-market accounting was supposed to make the banks responsible for their own business risk in a world of shadow banking.
The essay in the American is excellent. However, it leaves unanswered one question which I would like to see addressed: How were banks allowed to keep mortgage securities (and other risky assets) off their balance sheets in SPVs and SIVs? Weighting assets by risk, although it seems to have had some unintended perverse consequences, at least has some logic behind it. I can see no logic to allowing banks not to report risky assets at all.
Seems that the biggest myth of all is that Diamond & Dybvig (1983) is no longer relevant. Their model, in a sentence: Borrowing short and lending long (or, “banking”) is inherently unstable.
D&D could only find government-based insurance of financial entities as an answer. That apparently was not good enough for the political climate of the nineties & naughties. Paulson got tarred for “bailing out” the (uninsured) Bear Stearns and so let Lehmann go down all the way to zero. This unremarkably supported D&D's main thesis, but between outrage at moral hazard and populist sentiment, the main point was missed.
So, here again:
Banking is inherently unstable. Shadow-banking, e.g., money market funds and hedge funds, without much of any regulation, is unstable. Non-Glass-Steagal banking is not only unstable, it borrows the appearance of stability by being affiliated with prescribed D&D support mechanism. FASB forebearance of off-balance-sheet obligations & rose-colored balance sheets shows we like the wild West where somebody getting a bit aggressive on Wall Street can give unwanted vacations to construction workers in Nevada.
Under the D&D model, the slightest rumor is enough to set off a run. Exhibit A: the $1.5Trillion, one afternoon attempted run when the Reserve Fund broke a buck last September. There is lots of wishful thinking that markets are self-equilibrating, and maybe in a micro sense they are, but we're buried in examples (currency crises in the US prior to the Fed; LTCM and many smaller market collapses; dozens of international crises) that financial markets fail.
Doesn't it come with its own moral hazards? Sure; see the S&L Crisis, ameliorated only by the greatly moderated level of systemic crisis. Counter to our desired political positions? Too bad. We're staring at the answer but refuse to see it.