January 5, 2010
The Economics of the Microsoft Case
January 5, 2010
The Economics of Illegal Drugs
January 5, 2010
Intellectuals and Society
January 5, 2010
Thinking Outside the House
January 5, 2010
FP2P Watch
January 5, 2010
The Books I Wish My Colleagues Would Write
January 4, 2010
Predictably Irrational or Predictably Rational?
January 4, 2010
My Sowell-mate on the Knowledge-Power Discrepancy
January 4, 2010
FP2P Watch


It doesn't seem so much a problem of who gets to tell the stories -- though more people is certainly better (with rapidly diminishing returns) -- but what incentives the story-tellers have to get it right.
Without proper incentives, we have 2 million rather than 2 hundred clowns passing on what their crystal ball reveals.
There has to be some way to turn this into a betting market. Or at least make it costly to vote on an idea, webpage, news item, etc. -- say, give the informavores a small and fixed number of votes per week. Suddenly they think twice about voting for a webpage because they're forced to think about the opportunity cost of that vote.
(Split the group of informavores into 7 equal sub-groups, and renew each one's vote basket on separate days of the week. This avoids people voting too much on items that appear earlier in the week, or being too stingy earlier in the week and holding out until the end, spending the left-overs on uninteresting stories.)
That's fine for things that don't have a right or wrong to them. But for things that do, we need something closer to betting markets.