BRYAN CAPLAN
May 7, 2013
Keynesian Bets: What's Out There
May 6, 2013
Keynesian Bets Bleg
May 6, 2013
The Pyramid of Macroeconomic Insight and Virtue
May 2, 2013
A Natalist Provision
May 1, 2013
I Was a Teenage Misanthrope
DAVID HENDERSON
May 5, 2013
John Thacker on Vaccinations and the Sequester
May 3, 2013
Chef Rudy's Virtues Project
May 2, 2013
My take on Reinhart and Rogoff
May 1, 2013
Medicare Kills a Program


Memories of a (slightly?) better time. At least in terms of the scope of federal govt.
Interestingly, the Civil Rights Cases, in which the Supreme Court struck down that law, were all cases of private segregation in public accomodations (in the North and South, and a sfar afield as San Francisco), not segregation compelled by law. In fact, the court assumed that the aggrieved plaintiffs could sue under state law and win, saying "Innkeepers and public carriers, by the laws of all the states, so far as we are aware, are bound, to the extent of their facilities, to furnish proper accommodation to all unobjectionable persons who in good faith apply for them."
This case is also why it is asserted that the 1964 Civil Rights Act ban on discrimination in public accomodations is based on the Commerce Clause, and not the 14th amendment. The Supreme Court, in dicta, said that there was no bvasis for Congress to pass such a aw other than under the 13th, 14th and 15th amendments, but that issue was never specifically argued by anyone, so that statement not binding precedent.
The case itself was viewed by many as a signal that the door was open to legal segregation, and legal segregation rose sharply after it (though not necessarily "because" of the case alone), leading up to Plessy v. Fergusson, when it was deeply entrenched. One particularly outraged opponent, Bishop Henry McNeil Turner, railed:
There was also, by the way, a Civil Rights Act of 1866.