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The author at Modeled Behavior in a related article titled Arnold Kling, Complexity Economist writes:
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Daniel Kuehn writes:
"I think it is reasonable to read history as saying that economic outcomes are pretty much orthogonal to macroeconomic policy moves, which is a fancy way of saying that the economy does what it does without regard to fiscal and monetary policy." Could you explain why you come to this view rather than, say, the view that fiscal policy works under certain conditions and not under others, and monetary policy works under certain conditions and not under others. A seeming lack of correlation seems to indicate to possiblities: You seem to be opting for (1.) over (2.). Why is that? Posted July 14, 2010 9:04 AM
8 writes:
What about socionomics? It has an answer to your question. Posted July 14, 2010 9:57 AM
david writes:
So... does this mean that Kling supports industrial policy on a national scale as is commonly practiced in East Asia and elsewhere? It isn't part of any mainstream economist's fiscal toolbox any more; only development economists (if that). But it is still possible. I mean, he clearly doesn't buy into the usual intellectual framework that justifies why the new pattern of trade and specialization that would arise in the absence of intervention is necessarily the unique optimum. Posted July 14, 2010 10:13 AM
Philo writes:
"I think that my least favorite Sumnerian proposition is that the Fed can affect the economy by announcing a long-term target for a nominal variable." No, it's not just *announcing* the target--it's *credibly* announcing the target, which (to sustain credibility) requires *actually hitting* the target consistently over time. Are you complaining that *the Fed can't hit its target*, which would imply that it can't credibly announce that it will hit the target? If so, you would really be agreeing with Sumner. He says "If P then Q," and you would be holding P to be *impossible*; by elementary logic that would make the whole conditional proposition *necessarily true*. But that isn't quite what you say; you do not directly reject the claim that the Fed *can* hit a target (for NGDP 12 or 18 months into the future). Well, if you allow that the Fed can do that, how can you deny that it can "affect the economy"? Posted July 14, 2010 10:27 AM
Contemplationist writes:
We can call this the "Psycho Minsky Model" Posted July 14, 2010 10:55 AM
Alex J. writes:
The fed doesn't have to convince "people" that it will hit its target. It has to convince just the right people -- the very smart people with money on the line on this very issue, the people most likely to predict the actual outcome correctly. The fed doesn't even have to convince all of the relevant traders, just enough to fleece the ones who get it wrong. I will now address Kling's "Define Money" conundrum. Everyone knows that a central bank can generate hyperinflation if it wants to: just print lots of money and use it to buy lots of stuff (aka Quantitative Easing). Everyone knows a central bank can preside over deflation: it just has to do nothing in certain circumstances. On the face of it, it would be odd if a central bank could hit both extremes, but not points in the middle. But what does putting money in circulation do if the central bank uses it to buy money-like bonds? (Tyler Cowen brought this up in his Econ Talk podcast on macro.) It doesn't do anything directly, it's like changing dimes for nickels. I believe that it is largely a signal of the central banks willingness to engage in quantitative easing in the future. If central bankers say "we're out of ammunition" while rates are still positive, that's a very strong signal that they are not going to engage in significant QE. Under normal circumstances, GDP and inflation putter along, V stays more or less the same and M putters along. The central banks change change rates up or down but it doesn't make much difference, it doesn't have to. Imagine a sailboat before a steady wind. The captain holds the wheel with a few tweaks and trims or loosens the various sails a bit. Compared to the force of the wind, his actions are a trivial component of the boat's actions. Even so, you'd be worried if the captain tied the wheel down and went below for a nap. Now the wind changes (aka V drops, or we discover we aren't as rich (GDP) as we thought we were). If the captain takes no action, the sails won't catch the wind and the ship will stall, or worse, capsize. The captain needs to sail close hauled instead of before the wind. If the central bank doesn't compensate for changes in V with changes in M, due to sticky wages and prices, disruption of price information via deflation, changes in solvency of debtors and lenders etc, the real economy will suffer. [OK, here the nautical analogy is getting streched.] The difference between the captain of a sailboat and the central bank is that instead of dealing with wind and water, the central bank is dealing with people who can anticipate the future (even if most of them don't do it very well). Therefore, if (the right) people believe the fed will act appropriately, V won't drop as much and the fed won't have to actually do much. Of course, since the people who have the most on the line will have the best idea of what the fed will do, the best way for the fed to convince them that it would be willing to engage in QE is to actually be willing to engage in QE. I think that the longer the fed goes without serious action, and especially if said action in the past led to bad inflation, the less plausible will be the idea that against deflation, the fed will close the barn doors before the cows get out: cyclical monetary theory. (Bringing back the sailing analogy, the captain gets used to making minor adjustments and doesn't tack when it's called for.) Posted July 14, 2010 11:59 AM
Gregor writes:
"But for nominal wages to be sticky, workers cannot be forward-looking and focused on monetary policy." I don't think so. There are several models in which the public has forward looking rational expectations and yet nominal rigidities still exist. This could occur if wage contacts are staggered – if some fraction of the workforce has signed two, three or four year contacts downward adjustment will be slow. It will also be slow if some fraction of the workforce (such as the unionized public sector workers) is never forced to accept a nominal wage reduction. I think the strongly evidence suggests that: 1) wages adjust downward relatively slowly Posted July 14, 2010 12:17 PM
steve writes:
I think you have lot right here. I think of fiscal policy as just providing a bridge until new patterns of trade and specialization emerge. As we go through cycles of creation and destruction, they are more tolerable if we minimize the negative effects. Steve Posted July 14, 2010 12:39 PM
robbl writes:
Arnold, Based on your belief in the need for "new specializations" shouldn't the government step in with tax subsidies and loan guarantees to nudge workers in the proper direction? Or is your position that the "new specializations" are unknown in their character? If so, what is known? Clearly not much about economics. Posted July 14, 2010 12:44 PM
Nathan Smith writes:
Why the stimulus didn't work this time: In short, the stimulus was incompetently executed, much worse than, say, the Iraq War. The lesson I draw from this is that James Buchanan and Richard Wagner, in *Democracy in Deficit,* were right. Keynesian macroeconomic management might actually be a good idea, but since politicians will never do it even close to right, it's better for them not to try. The one exception is WARS. But you don't need Keynes to explain why wars stimulate the economy. Wars are purely destructive, so they make people poorer, and work harder. Posted July 14, 2010 1:31 PM
Rebecca Burlingame writes:
Why the stimulus didn't work this time: Posted July 14, 2010 2:21 PM
Lord writes:
I think there isn't just one kind of people. Some, leaders, are forward looking. Others, followers, are backward looking. The former respond to policy changes, the latter to market changes. The former act and in doing so persuade the latter to follow. The former are quick and the latter slow, so turnarounds can be slow but once the latter have built up momentum, difficult to reverse. The Fed hasn't persuaded the former it has done enough yet. Posted July 14, 2010 3:24 PM
Pete writes:
But for nominal wages to be sticky, workers cannot be forward-looking and focused on monetary policy. I feel like I am missing something here: are we overlooking the effects of unemployment? It appears that we are only taking psychological effects into account, but workers can be forward-looking, expect inflation, but as long as AD stalls (and disinflation takes hold) and employment is still in the dumps, and nominal wages stay put. Am I straying from the mark? Posted July 14, 2010 3:40 PM
Jfox writes:
I agree completely, albiet with a few twists. Arnold, if you're reading this I'd suggest spending a bit of time on this subject in your text. Actually, I'd recommend that you write several texts....maybe 3. I don't think one can really do justice to the entire subject of econ/finance in 1 book. With that said, I have 3 comments. 1. I think monetary policy was probably more effective in the past when the "banking" sector (i.e., excluding securities mkts and shadow banking) constituted a larger piece of the money/debt markets. The Fed wielded a bigger monetary hammer. 2. Monetary policy seemed simpler in "old days". Now, I think fiscal policy is interferring with monetary policy. Each dollar in debt raised increases the deficit, which increases the quantity of gov't securities outstanding. Many of these are "money like" which has the unintended consequence of interferring with monetary policy. 3. You say Fed policy doesn't matter much because workers are backward looking. I think that is true. But....many investors are forward looking, and for them real interest rates (and nominal interest rates to an extent) matter. To the extent that the Fed can manipulate real interest rates, I think that a piece of GDP is correlated with interest rates. Posted July 14, 2010 5:39 PM
Arnold Kling writes:
interesting comments. The Doubtbook drafts that I am posting now pertain to the hypothetical first chapter, which is supposed to introduce the main characters in the drama. Once that is done, my thinking is to try to tell a chronological story, so that we see how economic ideas evolve from events as well as from new theoretical developments. Clearly, the increased complexity of financial markets is a major factor here. I cannot imagine someone in 1850 coming up with the same model of the interaction between finance and macro as someone in 2010. Posted July 14, 2010 8:23 PM
malcolm writes:
Saying that people think fiscal policy didn't work is not the same thing as fiscal policy not working. Joshua Aizenman, in voxeu, argued that state contactionary budgets offset the federal fiscal stimulus almost one for one. It's not that Posted July 14, 2010 10:16 PM
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