ARNOLD KLING
August 14, 2011
The Top Political Contributors
August 11, 2011
Gender and the New Commanding Heights
August 11, 2011
Jamie Galbraith Makes an Assumption
August 11, 2011
Macroeconometrics: The Science of Hubris
August 10, 2011
Real and Nominal Bond Yields
BRYAN CAPLAN
August 14, 2011
The Effect of Thumb Sucking on Income
August 12, 2011
The Voice of Cold, Hard Truth to All Would-Be Educators
August 12, 2011
Ability, Morality, and Prosperity: A Paper and a Report
August 11, 2011
The Theory of Time and Frittering
August 10, 2011
Male Variance and the Remnants of the Gender Gap
DAVID HENDERSON
August 9, 2011
Hayek in "Unbroken", Part Two
August 8, 2011
Hayek in "Unbroken"
August 5, 2011
James Bovard on the Peace Corps
August 4, 2011
Summers Way Off on FDR and 1941
August 3, 2011
The "Amazon" Tax


It's not a sexy answer, but how about any "run of the mill" recession? Shouldn't we try to understand those before we obsess over the once in a 100 years outliers?
I think this is true in a lot of places except macroeconomics. It's common to just throw out the outliers, but in macro, those are the data points that actually get all the attention.
Why not the depression of 1920. It might be just as enlightening to study depressions that turned around quickly.
Also how about the long depression of 1891 and the the Panic of 1837.
I would add 1920-21 to contrast with demand-side recessions that get a lot of press.
There's a lot of talk about benign vs. malign inflation, but less about benign deflation - for that perhaps 1873. It was important as a historical event and also affords the opportunity to talk about benign deflations.
I think "jobless recoveries" are still an important topic that merits a lot of thought. 1992 might be quintessential for that.
I'd vote for the Panic of 1837 as the closest dry-run to a Wile E. Coyote on the current debt/inflation gig. Next go-round the Fed plays Second Bank of US, Tea Party plays Jacksonian Democrats, GMU econ plays Kitchen Cabinet.
The hyperinflation spell in Germany during the early Weimar Republic.
Will be ridiculed by many, but Soviet Union's collapse was predicated by many of the same demographic and extensive (as opposed to intensive) resource utilization factors. Basically it relied on extensive growth in labor, land, and energy resources. What the growth stopped the society collapsed. The back end of the boomer wave is similar in magnitude, similar oil dependency in the US.
Sorry for double post...
What the growth stopped the society collapsed = WHEN the growth (in these factors) stopped...
Other parallels -- Russia's domination of its vassal states (and claim on their resources) is similar to the US domination of post-WW2 Europe and Japan. Afghanistan.
I say the Panic of 1825 in Britain and the subsequent depression is incredibly important, perhaps the most so when compared to how much attention it actually gets. Include the general economic instability worldwide (The Panic of 1819 in the US, for instance) and you've got what I believe to be the proto-typical model for modern debt-driven boom bust cycles.
How about the depression that did not happen after WWII. Any macro explanation that involves aggregate demand and any hint of a government spending multiplier must do more than wave its hands at this case.
How about the Black Death between 1348 and 1350? I think that beats anything modern by a long shot.
@Doc Merlin
I was thinking about that but then thought about it a second time based on the criteria "economic contraction to study". While it had a massive effect on productivity I'm not quite sure if it was interesting from an economic perspective. It didn't break the guilds nor (and I am not an expert) have any major economic impact short of simply shifting the S/D curve left by a huge absolute number while leaving the equilibrium the same.
@Peter, Marlin:
Another way to look at the plague is as a symptom, not a cause. Other words, plague was a constant threat over centuries, reason it broke out in 1340's was due to overall economic decline, as a result of advancing statism in the era.
It's a bit like looking at the Barbarian Invasions in isolation from Rome's economic decline.
How about Taiwanies growth for a generation? Itwas highly command and control yet it grew like crazy. Never quite understood how a non-democratic government that from what I know regulated everything in business, paid for all schooling including college but had quotes on degree types, and was highly protectionist could grow like crazy for so long.
South Sea Bubble of 1720 had international ramifications.