How would your career have been different if you had failed all the classes you've totally forgotten?

As it happened I was also debating Bryan Caplan, who I thought and still think, would admit that one's actual level of conscientiousness is probably genetically determined. And, further that this personality attribute underlies most of what the normal world would call "laziness."

[I]f one is sympathetic towards those born blind does it not follow that one should be sympathetic towards those born lazy?

Now, that having been said I recognize that there will be a huge visceral aversion to this line of reasoning. And, so I want to do what I can to calm that aversion.

My point was that the reason we feel so differently about disabilities like blindness as opposed to disabilities like laziness, is that its really difficult to fake being blind. Thus there is much less concern that the blind person is taking advantage of you by lying about their blindness.

Its much more difficult to confirm laziness. So much so that people are hesitant to think of it as not a innate property of the person at all. However, our psychological research strongly suggests that this is not true.

But laziness is totally different from blindness: laziness is a choice, and blindness isn't.  Karl ably explained my reasoning during the debate: Laziness, unlike blindness, responds to sufficiently extreme incentives, and something can only respond to incentives if you are able to do otherwise. 

Consequentialists naturally tend to misinterpret this statement as saying, "We should punish laziness in order to reduce laziness."  But my point is about philosophy of mind, not policy.  The responsiveness of laziness to incentives shows that being lazy is a choice.   

Of course, you could just bite the bullet and insist that what appear to be choices are never "really" choices.  But that goes against all mental experience, and should be dismissed as absurd.

One last point: Many people (Scott Sumner among them, I fear) would be tempted to complain that I stubbornly cling to whatever moral intuitions I deem to be "obvious," while Karl actually tries to prove his moral conclusions.  My reply: Karl rests all of his moral conclusions on a single utilitarian premise.  And what is that premise?  If you say, "Just another intuition," you're being generous.  The utilitarian intuition is a paper tiger, subject to a long-standing list of devastating counter-examples.  Utilitarians' standard replies are to (a) change the subject by denying the empirical importance of the counter-examples, and (b) dogmatically accept every absurd implication of their view while criticizing the "dogmatism" of everyone who demurs.  If this isn't ridiculous enough, utilitarians proceed to continuously violate their own ethic by failing to spend all their spare resources on desperate strangers.

I'm not saying that human happiness isn't morally important.  I'm saying that human happiness is one morally important thing on a long list of morally important things: desert, justice, honesty, achievement, truth, beauty, and liberty are merely the beginning.  The only way to weigh them against each other is with clarifying examples and reflection.  Morality would be a lot simpler if utilitarianism were true.  But it's better to be broadly right than simply wrong.

To understand what Murray does in Coming Apart, imagine this analogy:

A social scientist visits a Gulf Coast town. He notices that the houses near the water have all been smashed and shattered. The former occupants now live in tents and FEMA trailers. The social scientist writes a report:

The evidence strongly shows that living in houses is better for children and families than living in tents and trailers. The people on the waterfront are irresponsibly subjecting their children to unacceptable conditions.

When he publishes his report, somebody points out: "You know, there was a hurricane here last week." The social scientist shrugs off the criticism with the reply, "I'm writing about housing, not weather."

Across the developed world, we see the wages of the bottom half (and in some cases more than half) have stagnated, even as gains have accrued to the top 20%, bigger gains to the top 5%, and the biggest gains to the top 1%.

A social scientist visits a Gulf Coast town. He notices that the houses near the water have all been smashed and shattered. The former occupants now live in tents and FEMA trailers. They're also malnourished because they keep leaving their food on the beach, where the evening tide quickly carries it out to sea.  The social scientist writes a report:

The evidence strongly shows that the hurricane is causing severe malnutrition.  Back when these people had houses they kept their food inside.  The government is turning its back on the indirect effects of natural disaster.

When he publishes his report, somebody points out: "You know, those hungry people could keep their food in their tents at night." The social scientist shrugs off the criticism with the reply, "I'm writing about malnutrition, not food storage."

Robin has spent decades proposing unconventional policy deals.  His track record is an abysmal failure.

Imagine that economists were surveyed and had to choose how they'd best like to describe economic policy recommendations, as:

1. Morals - Arguing for the morality of actions,
2. Deals - Helping groups find and make deals, or
3. Showing Off - Academics do hard things in order to be certified by other academics as impressive, so that students, patrons, and readers can gain status by affiliation with them. Economic policy analysis is such a hard thing.

I'd bet that at least 25% would choose option #2, and even more among those whose style leans sci/tech.

With those three options, I'd expect the breakdown to be roughly 15% morals, 80% deals, and 5% showing off.  But that's just because Robin omits two popular response options:

4. Social Welfare - Identifying the policies that are best for society as a whole.

5. Smart Partisanship - Identifying the most efficient way to advance the political goals you identify with.

With these extra options on the table, I'd bet on a breakdown of 5% morals (which sounds medieval to most economists), 20% deals, 5% showing off, 50% social welfare, and 20% smart partisanship.  Do you disagree, Robin?

P.S. Maybe we could get this on the next Kauffman bloggers' survey?

My closest colleagues seem to mostly take a morals view, but many of my students like a deals view. I think I see a correlation whereby academics who lean toward a sci/tech style tend to favor a deals view, while those who lean toward a humanities style tend to favor a morals view. Sci/tech styles tend more toward math, precision, and local incremental contributions toward specific things and plans, while humanities styles tend more toward bigger pictures, wider-ranging applications, broader interpretations, and joining larger conversations.

In sum, how you think about economic recommendations may depend on whether your thinking leans near or far. It seems deals are near, while morals are far, and sci/tech folks lean near, while humanities folks lean far. Precise formal analysis is more near, while flexible more-metaphorical discussion is more far. Particular suggestions for particular conflicts of particular groups is more near, while general more accessible discussion about what choices tend to be good or bad is more far.

My claim: Robin's "dealism" is actually an extremely "far" doctrine.  The doctrine is so far, in fact, that Robin keeps missing some basic facts:

Fact #1: Robin has spent decades proposing unconventional policy deals.  His track record is an abysmal failure.  Correct me if I'm wrong, but to the best of my knowledge:

• Zero Hansonian deals have been adopted.
• Zero Hansonian deals have come close to adoption.
• Zero Hansonian deals have been embraced by any normal person.  His proposals appeal almost exclusively to fans of economics, libertarianism, futurism, and science fiction.
  

The reason for Robin's failure is pretty obvious: Most human beings are far too conventional and stubborn to even consider Robin's suggestions.  And instead of trying to overcome this hurdle, Robin habitually raises the hurdle by criticizing conventional attitudes.  (The latest example).  No realtor would do this.

1. Where Bryan sees college as a useful signaling device for those who are cognitively gifted, I see it as a useful segregation device for the Vickies.

As I've said several times, I see college as a useful signaling device not just for intelligence, but for two "Vicky" traits: conscientiousness and conformity.  Which makes me wonder: If college is where the Vickies go, won't college be a strong signal that you're a Vicky?  If so, Arnold's model morphs into mine.

2. The segregation model predicts that as the society gets wealthier, the dollar cost of college will get higher. The signaling model would not necessarily predict that. In fact, it would predict that the market would try to find less expensive signals.

Au contraire.  Not only does the the signaling model predict that a higher payoff for college will increase demand for signals; it predicts that if the price of signaling falls, people need to increase their quantity of signaling to remain separate from the pack.  As I've explained before:

Many economists assume that market forces will somehow figure out a way to make signaling costs disappear.  But as far as I can tell, they never explain why signaling costs would be easier to eliminate than any other costs.  And on reflection, the truth is precisely the reverse: Signaling costs are especially hard to eliminate.  Why?  Because when you make signaling cheaper, agents' natural response is to signal more intensely or on another dimension.

Let me illustrate my claim with a prediction: The typical engagement ring will always cost several weeks' income.  If industry figures out how to cheaply synthesize gold and diamonds, we'll start making engagement rings out of something else - platinum and rubies, or ivory and T-rex teeth.  Why?  Because one major function of engagement rings is to signal commitment with an expensive gift!  To separate the sheep from the goats, the signal has to be expensive enough to convince the goats to give up.

Arnold again:

3. The segregation model predicts the emergence of institutions like Boston University and George Washington University, which require much more money than brains to attend, and yet which have fairly high prestige, considering.

I'm happy to admit that, in addition to their other functions, colleges are social clubs.   I suspect that this social club function is especially important for religious colleges (think Brigham Young) and less-selective private colleges.  But even if students in "clubby" colleges are implausibly apathetic about impressing future employers, belonging to any selective club almost automatically sends a signal.  As long as (a) the average graduate of BU or GWU possesses special traits that employers value; and (b) employers can't costlessly measure these traits, a BU or GWU degree will pay off in the labor market.

4. I think that if either the utilitarian model or the signaling model of higher education were correct, I would be sure to collect on any bet I make with Bryan about the demise of colleges. If college as we know it manages to persist for another two decades, it will be thanks to the segregation model.

When someone asks for your support, it's natural to wonder, "Why do you need my support in the first place?"  Some answers are better than others.  If your friend asks you to pay for his lunch, "I was just mugged" is a better reason than "I already spent my whole paycheck on beer."  If your girlfriend misses your birthday, "My car and phone both broke down" is a better reason than "I forgot."  If a co-worker goes home early and asks you to cover for him, "I have the flu" is a better reason than "I want to play Skyrim." 

The key difference: If there are reasonable steps the person could take - or could have taken - to avoid his problem.  Your friend didn't have to spend all his money on beer.  Your girlfriend could have put your birthday on her calendar.  Your co-worker could wait to play Skyrim.  These steps may not be appealing, but they are reasonable. There are grey areas, but you can usually tell which is which. 

I propose to use the same standard to identify the "deserving" and "undeserving" poor.  The deserving poor are those who can't take - and couldn't have taken - reasonable steps to avoid poverty. The undeserving poor are those who can take - or could have taken - reasonable steps to avoid poverty.  Reasonable steps like: Work full-time, even if the best job you can get isn't fun; spend your money on food and shelter before you get cigarettes or cable t.v.; use contraception if you can't afford a child.  A simple test of "reasonableness": If you wouldn't accept an excuse from a friend, you shouldn't accept it from anyone.

If I sound harsh, notice: by my standards, many of the poor are clearly deserving: low-skilled workers in the Third World, children of poor or irresponsible parents, the severely handicapped.  Still, on reflection, many people we think of as "poor" turn out to be undeserving. 

Let's start with healthy adults in the First World.  Even the least-skilled full-time jobs pay more than enough for adults to comfortably support themselves.  In the U.S., the average income for janitors is about $25,000/year; the average for maids is about $21,000.  A household with one janitor and one maid averages $46,000, enough to put them at the 96^th percentile of the world income distribution - and well above the U.S. poverty line.  Even Americans below the poverty line typically possess a long list of luxuries that the Kings of France would have envied: 80% have air conditioning, nearly three-quarters own a car, two-thirds have cable or satellite t.v., one-third have a plasma or LCD t.v.  My point isn't that all healthy adults in the First World do enjoy such living standards, but that there are reasonable steps they can take - or could have taken - to do so.

 The same logic applies to everyone who used to be a healthy adult in the First World.  Were there reasonable steps you could have taken earlier to avoid poverty?  Sure.  The elderly could have saved more.  The sick could have bought insurance.  It's tempting to say, "When they were young and healthy, they didn't have the money!"  But didn't they have the money for cable t.v. and beer?

Some people think it's pointless to talk about desert.  I disagree.  If you're a libertarian who opposes any government spending on the poor no matter what, you should still consider desert when you give to charity.  Starving Haitian children really do deserve your help more than almost any American.  If you have a more expansive view of the proper role of government, you should still see a big difference between forcing taxpayers to help starving kids, and forcing taxpayers to help irresponsible adults.  If you've ever told a frustrating friend or relative, "It's your mess, you clean it up," you should see the injustice in forcing taxpayers to support undeserving people they don't even know.

The most important lesson, though, is that First World governments' priorities are upside-down.  The Third World contains hundreds of millions of deserving poor: desperate people who would love to work as a janitor for $25,000 a year.  If we owe charity to anyone, we owe it to people who struggle to earn a dollar a day.  But when First World governments hand out charity, the deserving poor in the Third World get next to nothing.  Foreign aid's about 1% of the budget.  Indeed, First World governments actively prevent the world's deserving poor from helping themselves: They make it illegal for them to move to the First World and accept a job from a willing employer.   Even if we owe charity to no one, the least we can do is stop kicking the world's deserving poor while they're down.

I would like to know why you think this book is so extra-special. I read the first chapter for which you provided the link. It was well written, but I saw nothing there that I haven't read a hundred times.  I am a consequentialist libertarian myself, and I find the radical approach very unconvincing, especially when one considers some of the potential consequences when one takes such an absolutist view against government.

I can see how you might think Huemer is merely hewing to a standard dogmatic natural rights position, which has indeed been done a hundred times.  But he's not.  He starts from much weaker premises, along the lines of "You shouldn't coerce other people without a good reason."  And a prime example of  "good reason," for Huemer, is "There would be very bad consequences of not coercing."  He never claims that consequences don't matter.  His reply to the consequentialist defense of government is:

(a) The defense only implies the rightness of government coercion when the consequences of not coercing are in fact very bad.

(b) Almost everyone sees that many, if not most, laws don't actually prevent very bad consequences.

(c) The good consequences of government coercion in the remaining, controversial cases are greatly overrated.

One big problem with libertarian consequentialism is that it focuses almost exclusively on (c).  Huemer's insight is that you can get very far with (a) + (b) alone.

And if I am not convinced, someone who is very skeptical of 90% of the acts of government, all the more reason that your average statist (a majority of the citizenry) will reject these ideas out of hand.

Empirically, you're right.  Most people can't be persuaded.  I admire Huemer's book because would change the minds of reasonable, fair-minded people on many moderate points - and at least pique their curiousity about his more radical positions.

I presume you have read the whole book. Can you give us some more clues as to what Huemer says that is different from previous writers?

You presume correctly.  What's great about the book is that he grants the plausibility of many seemingly statist intuitions, avoids absurd absolutism and obscurantism, and still reaches strong libertarian conclusions.  I was repeatedly surprised by how far he gets without assuming anything controversial.

I have no interest in reading it if he doesn't have fresh ideas, even if it is very well written.

Consequentialists will be tempted to dismiss it as yet another dogmatic natural rights book.  Natural rights theorists will be tempted to dismiss it as confused consequentialism.  But both dismissals are wrong.  Huemer is doing something novel: Starting with pluralist common-sense morality and ending with radical libertarianism.

And I don't see how it could have any affect on the population at large in that case.

I doubt one philosopher can have much effect on the population at large no matter how fresh his ideas are.  What a philosopher can do is bend over backwards to persuade reasonable people who don't already agree with him.  Which is precisely what Huemer does.

Update: In response to M.R. Orlowski, there's still no official publication date.  I'm guessing early 2013.

Mandy says she would be afraid to go back without some proof that you were disposed to treat us justly and kindly; and we have concluded to test your sincerity by asking you to send us our wages for the time we served you. This will make us forget and forgive old scores, and rely on your justice and friendship in the future. I served you faithfully for thirty-two years, and Mandy twenty years. At twenty-five dollars a month for me, and two dollars a week for Mandy, our earnings would amount to eleven thousand six hundred and eighty dollars. Add to this the interest for the time our wages have been kept back, and deduct what you paid for our clothing, and three doctor's visits to me, and pulling a tooth for Mandy, and the balance will show what we are in justice entitled to. Please send the money by Adams's Express, in care of V. Winters, Esq., Dayton, Ohio. If you fail to pay us for faithful labors in the past, we can have little faith in your promises in the future. We trust the good Maker has opened your eyes to the wrongs which you and your fathers have done to me and my fathers, in making us toil for you for generations without recompense. Here I draw my wages every Saturday night; but in Tennessee there was never any pay-day for the negroes any more than for the horses and cows. Surely there will be a day of reckoning for those who defraud the laborer of his hire.